Scalable & Resilient Vehicle-Centric Certificate Revocation List
  Distribution in Vehicular Communication Systems by Khodaei, Mohammad & Papadimitratos, Panos
1Scalable & Resilient Vehicle-Centric Certificate
Revocation List Distribution in Vehicular
Communication Systems
Mohammad Khodaei, Member, IEEE, and Panos Papadimitratos, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—In spite of progress in securing Vehicular Communication (VC) systems, there is no consensus on how to distribute Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRLs). The main challenges lie exactly in (i) crafting an efficient and timely distribution of CRLs for numerous
anonymous credentials, pseudonyms, (ii) maintaining strong privacy for vehicles prior to revocation events, even with honest-but-curious
system entities, (iii) and catering to computation and communication constraints of on-board units with intermittent connectivity to the
infrastructure. Relying on peers to distribute the CRLs is a double-edged sword: abusive peers could “pollute” the process, thus
degrading the timely CRLs distribution. In this paper, we propose a vehicle-centric solution that addresses all these challenges and thus
closes a gap in the literature. Our scheme radically reduces CRL distribution overhead: each vehicle receives CRLs corresponding only
to its region of operation and its actual trip duration. Moreover, a “fingerprint” of CRL ‘pieces’ is attached to a subset of (verifiable)
pseudonyms for fast CRL ‘piece’ validation (while mitigating resource depletion attacks abusing the CRL distribution). Our experimental
evaluation shows that our scheme is efficient, scalable, dependable, and practical: with no more than 25 KB/s of traffic load, the latest
CRL can be delivered to 95% of the vehicles in a region (15×15 KM) within 15s, i.e., more than 40 times faster than the state-of-the-art.
Overall, our scheme is a comprehensive solution that complements standards and can catalyze the deployment of secure and
privacy-protecting VC systems.
Index Terms—Vehicular Communications, VANETs, Vehicular PKI, Certificate Revocation, CRL Distribution, Security, Privacy, Efficiency
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1 INTRODUCTION
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I)
communications seek to enhance transportation safety and
efficiency with a gamut of applications, ranging from colli-
sion avoidance alerts to traffic conditions updates; moreover,
they can integrate and enrich Location Based Services
(LBSs) [1], [2] and vehicular social networks [3], and provide
infotainment services. It has been well-understood that
Vehicular Communication (VC) systems are vulnerable to
attacks and that the privacy of their users is at stake. As a
result, security and privacy solutions have been developed
by standardization bodies (IEEE 1609.2 WG [4] and ETSI [1],
[5], [6]), harmonization efforts (Car2Car Communication
Consortium (C2C-CC) [7]), and projects (SeVeCom [8],
PRESERVE [9], and CAMP [10]). A consensus towards using
Public Key Cryptography (PKC) to protect V2V/V2I (V2X)
communication is reached: a set of Certification Authorities
(CAs) constitutes the Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure
(VPKI), providing multiple anonymous credentials, termed
pseudonyms, to legitimate vehicles. Vehicles switch from one
pseudonym to a non-previously used one towards unlink-
ability of digitally signed messages, and improved sender
privacy for V2V/V2I messages. Pseudonymity is conditional
in the sense that the corresponding long-term vehicle identity
(Long Term Certificate (LTC)) can be retrieved by the VPKI
entities if deviating from system policies.
In fact, vehicles can be compromised or faulty and dis-
seminate erroneous information across the V2X network [11],
[12]. They should be held accountable for such actions
and credentials (their LTCs and their pseudonyms) can be
revoked. To efficiently revoke a set of pseudonyms, one can
disclose a single entry for all (revoked) pseudonyms of the
vehicle [13], [14], [15], [16]. However, upon a revocation
event, all non-revoked (but expired) pseudonyms belonging
to the ‘‘misbehaving’’ vehicle would also be linked. Linking
pseudonyms with lifetimes prior to a revocation event
implies that all the corresponding digitally signed messages
will be trivially linked. Even if revocation is justified, this
does not imply that a user ‘‘deserves’’ to abolish privacy
prior to the revocation event. Avoiding such a situation,
i.e., achieving what is termed in the literature as perfect-
forward-privacy [17], can be guaranteed if the VPKI entities
are fully-trustworthy [18]. However, we need to guarantee
strong user privacy even in the presence of honest-but-curious
VPKI entity; recent revelations of mass surveillance show
that assuming service providers are fully-trustworthy is no
longer a viable approach.
A main concern, relevant to all proposals in the litera-
ture [15], [16], [18], [19], [20], [21] is efficiency and scalability,
essentially low communication and computation overhead
even as system dimension grows. Consider first typical
operational constraints: the average daily commute time is
less than an hour (on average 29.2 miles and 46 minutes per
day) [10], [22], [23] while the latencies for the dissemination
of a full Certificate Revocation List (CRL) can exceed the
actual trip duration [24]. One can compress CRL using a
Bloom Filter (BF) [12], [25], [26]; however, the size of a CRL
grows linearly with the number of revoked pseudonyms,
thus necessitates larger BFs. More so, a sizable portion of the
CRL information is irrelevant to a receiving vehicle and can
be left unused. This, at the system level, constitutes waste
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2of computation, communication (bandwidth), and storage
resources. In turn, it leads to higher latency for all vehicles to
reconstruct the CRL, i.e., a degradation of timely distribution.
Alternatively, vehicles can only validate revocation status
of (their neighbors’) pseudonyms via an Online Certificate
Status Protocol (OCSP). Even if a VPKI can comfortably
handle such a demanding load [27], OCSP cannot be used as
a standalone solution in VC systems: it requires continuous
connectivity and significant bandwidth dedicated to revo-
cation traffic, thus impractical due to the network volatility
and scale [12]. Moreover, what would be the course of action
if the VPKI were not reachable for other reasons, e.g., during
a Denial of Service (DoS) attack? So, the challenge is how
can one distribute the most relevant revocation information to a
given vehicle, per trip, and ensure timely revocation even without
uninterrupted connectivity to the VPKI?
The computation overhead for the verification of the CRL
could interfere with safety- and time-critical operations espe-
cially if one considers typical VC rates of 10 safety beacons
per second, and thus processing of possibly hundreds of
messages from neighboring vehicles per second. Simply put,
with existing computation and communication overhead and
the time-critical nature of safety applications, minimizing the
overhead for CRL verification and distribution is paramount.
From a different viewpoint, we need to allocate as little
bandwidth as possible for the CRL distribution in order
not to interfere with safety-critical operations or enable an
attacker to broadcast a fake CRL at a high rate. However, this
should be hand in hand with timely CRL distribution. This
can be achieved with the use of Roadside Units (RSUs) [19];
however, dense deployment of RSUs in a large-scale envi-
ronment is costly. If the deployment is sparse, a significant
delay could be introduced. Alternatively, the CRL can be
distributed in a peer-to-peer, epidemic manner [15], [16],
[18]. This is a double-edged sword: abusive peers, seeking to
compromise the trustworthiness of the system, could pollute
the CRL distribution and mount a clogging DoS attack. Such
an attack relates other content dissemination, e.g., vehicular
social networks [3], yet it is critical to mitigate it for CRL
distribution: delaying or preventing legitimate users from
obtaining the most up-to-date CRL pieces would result in
prolonging the operation of a malicious compromised vehicle
in the system.
Moreover, a vehicle could be wrongly identified as
a misbehaving entity, e.g., a false positive in an event-
based misbehavior detection [25], [28], or a vehicle sensor
malfunction, e.g., a communication breakdown or a problem
in a safety-critical system (e.g., steering or braking [29]). Thus,
the LTC as well as all pseudonyms of the ‘‘misbehaving’’
entity would be revoked, with the revocation information to
be distributed/made available to all vehicles in the network.
This raises two challenges: misbehavior could be falsely iden-
tified, or the sensor malfunctioning could be transient, thus
distributing ‘‘imprecise’’ revocation information, likely in
high volumes. The effect would be waste of communication
(bandwidth) and higher convergence time to reconstruct the
CRL, i.e., degradation of timely CRL distribution. Repairing
a faulty sensor or patching the vehicle software or resolving
the erroneous eviction implies the vehicle can rejoin the
system as legitimate participant. This means the vehicle
needs to obtain a fresh batch of pseudonyms, e.g., for another
three years [10], i.e., imposing unnecessary workload on
the VPKI entities. Therefore, a flexible design with easily
reversible revocation status that allows to temporarily evict a
misbehaving or malfunctioning vehicle from the system until
the issue is resolved would address this challenge. By the
same token, we need to ensure that such temporal eviction
of a vehicle does not harm user privacy; in other words,
exactly because such a flexible design allows resolution and
temporal eviction, a single VPKI entity should not be able to
link the corresponding (successive) pseudonyms of the same
vehicle, upon rejoining the system.
Furthermore, the VPKI system must narrow down the
vulnerability window, i.e., the interval between a revocation
event/incident until all vehicles successfully obtain the
latest revocation information. Thus, if a new revocation
event happens when the base-CRL has already been dis-
tributed, the VPKI entities should release ∆-CRLs in order
to close down the vulnerability window. However, frequent
distribution of such revocation information could affect
the performance of VC systems. More important, abusive
peers could mount a clogging DoS attack on the ∆-CRLs
distribution. A lightweight, i.e., incurring low computation
and communication overhead, and resilient mechanism for
distributing ∆-CRLs would address this challenge.
Despite the plethora of research efforts, none addresses all
challenges at hand. In this paper, we show how to efficiently
revoke a very large volume of pseudonyms while providing
strong user privacy protection, even in the presence of honest-
but-curious VPKI entities. Our system effectively, resiliently, and
in a timely manner disseminate the authentic CRL throughout a
large-scale (multi-domain) VC system. Moreover, we ensure that
the CRL distribution incurs low overhead and prevents abuse of the
distribution mechanism. Furthermore, our flexible design allows to
temporarily evict a vehicle from the system without compromising
user privacy. At the same time, it facilitates rejoining the system as
a legitimate participant upon resolving the issue without imposing
unnecessary workload on the VPKI entities, by frequently refilling
pseudonyms pool, and, most important, shields the system from
clogging DoS attacks leveraging the CRL and ∆-CRL distribution.
Contributions: Our comprehensive security and privacy-
preserving solution systematically addresses all key aspects
of CRL-based revocation, i.e., security, privacy, and effi-
ciency. This is based on few simple yet powerful, as it
turns out, ideas. We propose making the CRL acquisition
process vehicle-centric: each vehicle only receives the pieces of
CRLs corresponding to its targeted region and its actual trip
duration, i.e., obtaining only region- and time-relevant revo-
cation information. Moreover, randomly chosen pseudonyms
issued by the VPKI are selected to piggyback a notification
about new CRL-update events and an authenticator for
efficiently validating pieces of the latest CRL; in other
words, validation of the CRL pieces almost for free. These
novel features dramatically reduce the CRL size and CRL
validation overhead, while they significantly increase its
resiliency against resource depletion attacks. Moreover, we
propose a secure, efficient, and resilient distribution mecha-
nism for ∆-CRL updates to narrow down the vulnerability
window. Furthermore, our scheme facilitates eviction of a
‘‘misbehaving’’ vehicle temporarily, i.e., for an interval until
the issue is resolved.
In the rest of the paper, we critically survey the literature
3(Sec. 2) and explain the system model (Sec. 3). We present sys-
tem design (Sec. 4), followed by qualitative and quantitative
analysis (Sec. 5). We then conclude the paper (Sec. 6).
2 RELATED WORK
The need to evict misbehaving or compromised [11] vehicles
from a VC system is commonly accepted, because such
vehicles can threaten the safety of vehicles and users and
degrade transportation efficiency. CRL distribution is of
central importance and it is the final and definitive line
of defense [1], [4], [8], [8], [25], [30]: only the VPKI can
‘‘ultimately’’ revoke a vehicle by including its unexpired
certificates’ serial numbers in a CRL.
The literature proposes distribution of the CRL via
RSUs [19] and car-to-car epidemic communication [15], [16],
[18], with enhancements on the distribution of pieces [20],
[21] evaluated in [31]. A naı¨ve solution would be to digitally
sign the entire CRL and broadcast it; however, it imposes
difficulties in downloading a large CRL file and exchanging
it over short contact period (with an RSU or a peer). Splitting
the digitally signed CRL into multiple pieces is vulnerable to
pollution attacks: in the absence of fine-grained authentication,
per CRL piece, an adversary can delay or even prevent
reception by injecting fake pieces. Thus, the straightforward
solution is to have the VPKI prepare the CRL, split it into
multiple pieces, sign each piece, and distribute all of them
across the VC system. RSUs can broadcast CRL pieces
randomly or in a round-robin fashion [19], and vehicles
can relay pieces until all vehicles receive all pieces necessary
to reconstruct the CRL [15]. Erasure codes can be used to
enhance the fault-tolerance of the CRL piece distribution in
the highly volatile VC environment [19], [32].
Signing each CRL piece so that it is self-verifiable, incurs
significant computation overhead, which grows linearly
with the number of CRL pieces, both for the VPKI and
for the receiving vehicles. Furthermore, an attacker could
aggressively forge CRL pieces for a Distributed DoS (DDoS)
attack leveraging signature verification delays [33] that can
prevent vehicles from obtaining the genuine CRL pieces. A
‘‘precode-and-hash’’ scheme [34] proposes to calculate a hash
value of each pre-coded piece, sign it, and disseminate it
with higher priority. Each relaying node can apply a different
precode to the original CRL and act as a secondary source.
However, by applying different encodings to the original
CRL file, another receiver cannot reconstruct the entire CRL
from the pieces, encoded differently by various relaying
nodes. To mitigate pollution and DoS attacks, we propose to
piggyback a fingerprint (a BF [35], [36]) for CRL pieces into
a subset of pseudonyms to validating CRL pieces ‘‘for free’’.
To efficiently revoke an ensemble of pseudonyms, one
can enable revocation of multiple pseudonyms with a single
CRL entry, to reduce the CRL size, e.g., [15], [16], [37].
Despite a huge reduction in size, such schemes do not
provide perfect-forward-privacy [17]: upon a revocation event
and CRL release, all the ‘‘non-revoked’’ but previously
expired pseudonyms belonging to the evicted entity would
be linked as well. Although forward-privacy can be achieved
by leveraging a hash chain [18], the pseudonyms’ issuer
can trivially link all pseudonyms belonging to a vehicle,
and thus the pseudonymously authenticated messages [38],
[39], [40], towards tracking it for the entire duration of
its presence in the system [13], [14], [15], [16], [18]. More
precisely, the CA specifies a ‘‘time interval’’ so that each
vehicle receives D pseudonyms during the pseudonym
acquisition process [18]. As a result, for each batch of revoked
pseudonyms, a single key is disclosed. But, upon a revocation
event, all pseudonyms within an interval are linked, because
one can decrypt all pseudonym serial numbers; thus, no
perfect-forward-privacy is achieved for that period. On the
contrary, in our scheme, upon a revocation event and CRL
release, it is infeasible to link the previously non-revoked (but
expired) pseudonyms belonging to a misbehaving vehicle.
This is so due to the utilization of a hash chain during the
pseudonym issuance process, thus achieving perfect-forward-
privacy [41].
Compressing CRLs using a BF was proposed for com-
pact storage of revocation entries [25], or to efficiently
distribute them across the network [12], [25], [26]. However,
the challenge is twofold: scalability and efficiency. Their
CRL size still grows linearly with the number of revoked
pseudonyms, while a substantial portion of the compressed
CRL can be irrelevant to a receiving vehicle and be left
unused. Moreover, compressing CRLs using a BF does
not necessarily reduce the size of a CRL as vehicles can
be provided with possibly hundreds of pseudonyms [4],
[41], [42]. Unlike such schemes [12], [25], [26], we do not
compress the CRL: our scheme disseminates only trip-
relevant revocation information to vehicles and it utilizes a
BF to provide a condensed authenticator for the CRL pieces.
Our scheme leverages and enhances the functionality of the
state-of-the-art VPKI system [43] towards efficiently revoking
a batch of pseudonyms without compromising user privacy
backwards: upon a revocation event, all pseudonyms prior
to the revocation event remain unlinkable.
Alternatively, vehicles could validate pseudonym status
information through OCSP. But, due to intermittent network
connectivity, significant usage of the bandwidth by time- and
safety-critical operations, and substantial overhead for the
VPKI (if it is reachable), OCSP cannot be used as a standalone
solution [12]. A hybrid solution could rely on distributing
certificate status information to other mobile nodes [44], [45];
however, the system would be subject to the reachability (of
sufficiently many cooperative) and the trustworthiness of
such nodes. In our scheme, we ensure that the latest CRL
is efficiently, effectively, and timely distributed among all
vehicles without any assumption on persistent reachability
and trustworthiness of specific mobile nodes.
Temporal eviction of a misbehaving or malfunctioning
vehicle from the VC system has received limited atten-
tion. There are several situations that a vehicle should
be temporarily evicted from the system until the issue is
resolved and the vehicle can rejoin the system, e.g., in case
a malfunctioning sensor disseminating false information.
Security Credential Management System (SCMS) [10], [46]
supports only permanent eviction of a misbehaving vehicle
by including a linkage seed into a CRL. Towards tempo-
ral revocation of credentials, [47], [48] propose a linkage
hook between any linkage seed and the corresponding pre-
linkage values in the original SCMS design. Thus, in order
to temporarily revoke the credentials, the linkage hook is
disclosed (instead of the linkage seed, used for permanently
4revoking the credentials). Temporal eviction of a subset of the
certificates requires additional layers to be added to the tree.
However, the disclosure of linkage hooks would trivially
link all pseudonyms inside a given subtree. Our scheme
facilitates eviction of a misbehaving vehicle temporarily, i.e.,
for a fine-grained interval, until the issue is resolved without
compromising user privacy (prior to the revocation event).
SCMS [10], [46] issues pseudonyms with the help of two
Linkage Authorities (LAs): a batch of 20-40 pseudonyms,
valid for a week, are issued for each vehicle without having
a single VPKI entity able to link them. In case of revocation,
a single entry is disclosed to invalidate the batch of revoked
pseudonyms. As a result of this binding, the size of a CRL
linearly grows with the number of compromised vehicles
(and not with the number of revoked pseudonyms). How-
ever, due to large number of pseudonyms carried by each
vehicle for a long period, e.g., 3 years [10] or 25 years [46],
the size of a CRL could be huge [42]. The VPKI [10], [46]
could provision vehicles for a long period, e.g., 25 years
worth of pseudonyms, with a decryption key for, e.g., a
weekly batch of pseudonyms, delivered periodically [42],
[46], [49]. This would eliminate the need for frequently
recurring bidirectional connectivity to the VPKI to obtain
pseudonyms. To evict a vehicle, the VPKI can stop delivering
the corresponding decryption key to the vehicle Hardware
Security Module (HSM). Still, it is imperative to distribute the
CRL and cover the (week long) period and the corresponding
revoked pseudonyms. Furthermore, having released a CRL
towards the end of a week, signed messages with the private
keys corresponding to the recently revoked pseudonyms
(included in the CRL) can be linked, i.e., achieving no perfect-
forward-privacy for that period [24].
3 MODEL AND REQUIREMENTS
3.1 System Model and Assumptions
A VPKI consists of a set of Certification Authorities (CAs)
with distinct roles: the Root CA (RCA), the highest-level
authority, certifies other lower-level authorities; the Long
Term CA (LTCA) is responsible for the vehicle registration
and the Long Term Certificate (LTC) issuance, and the
Pseudonym CA (PCA) issues pseudonyms for the registered
vehicles. Pseudonyms have a lifetime (a validity period),
typically ranging from minutes to hours; in principle, the
shorter the pseudonym lifetime is, the higher the unlinkabil-
ity and thus the higher privacy protection can be achieved.
We assume that each vehicle is registered only with its
Home-LTCA (H-LTCA), the policy decision and enforcement
point, reachable by the registered vehicles. Without loss of
generality, a domain can be defined as a set of vehicles in
a region, registered with the H-LTCA, subject to the same
administrative regulations and policies [50]. There can be
several PCAs, each active in one or more domains. Trust
between two domains can be established with the help of
the RCA, or through cross certification.
All vehicles (On-Board Units (OBUs)) registered in the
system are provided with HSMs, ensuring that private
keys never leave the HSM. Moreover, we assume that
there is a misbehavior detection system, e.g., [51], that
triggers the revocation. The Resolution Authority (RA) can
initiate a process to resolve and revoke all pseudonyms of
a misbehaving vehicle: it interacts with the corresponding
PCAs and LTCA (a detailed protocol description in [27],
[43], [52]) to resolve and revoke all credentials issued for a
misbehaving vehicle. Consequently, the misbehaving vehicle
can no longer obtain credentials from the VPKI. The VPKI
is responsible for distributing the CRLs and notifying all
legitimate entities about the revocation; this implies a new
CRL-update event.
3.2 Adversarial Model and Requirements
We extend the general adversary model in secure vehicular
communications [53] to include VPKI entities that are honest-
but-curious, i.e., entities complying with security protocols
and policies, but motivated to profile users. In a VC envi-
ronment, internal adversaries, i.e., malicious, compromised,
or non-cooperative clients, and external adversaries, i.e.,
unauthorized entities, raise four challenges. More specifically
in the context of this work, adversaries can try to (i) exclude
revoked pseudonym serial numbers from a CRL, (ii) add
valid pseudonyms by forging a fake CRL (piece), or (iii)
prevent legitimate entities from obtaining genuine and the
most up-to-date CRL (pieces), or delay the CRL distribution
by replaying old, spreading fake CRL (pieces), or performing
a DoS attack. This allows wrong-doers to remain operational
in the VC system using their current revoked pseudonym
sets. Moreover, they might be simply non-cooperative or
malicious, tempted to prevent other vehicles from receiving
a notification on a new CRL-update event, thus preventing
them from requesting to download the CRLs. Lastly, (iv)
VPKI entities (in collusion with vehicle communication ob-
servers) could potentially link messages signed under (non-
revoked but expired) pseudonyms prior to the revocation
events, e.g., inferring sensitive information from the CRLs
towards linking pseudonyms, and thus tracking vehicles
backwards. The PCAs operating in a domain (or across
domains) could also collude, i.e., share information that
each of them individually has, to harm user privacy.
Security and privacy requirements for V2X communica-
tions have been specified in the literature [53], and additional
requirements for VPKI entities in [43]. The security and
privacy requirements for the CRL distribution are: fine-
grained authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation, unlinkabil-
ity (perfect-forward-privacy), availability, efficiency, and explicit
and/or implicit notification on revocation events [41]. Beyond
these requirements, the revocation mechanism should be
flexible and provide the option for easily reversible certificate
status. More precisely, the system should facilitate temporal
eviction of a misbehaving or malfunctioning vehicle from
the system. By the same token, the revocation mechanism
should allow reinstating an entity previously revoked upon
resolving a misbehaving or malfunctioning issue that led to
the revocation; the temporarily-evicted entity could rejoin
the system and continue operating in the VC system. Even if
a vehicle is preloaded with pseudonyms for a longer period,
e.g., a year, it should be able to leverage the already obtained
credentials upon rejoining the system.
54 DESIGN
4.1 Motivation and Overview
Preliminary assumptions: We leverage a state-of-the-art
VPKI system [43], [54], [55] that provides pseudonyms in an
on-demand fashion: each vehicle ‘‘decides’’ when to trigger the
pseudonym acquisition process based on various factors [56],
[57]. Such a scheme requires sparse connectivity to the VPKI,
but it facilitates an OBU to be preloaded with pseudonyms
proactively, covering a longer period, e.g., a week or a month,
should the connectivity be expected heavily intermittent. The
efficiency, scalability and robustness of the VPKI system
is systematically investigated [43], [54], [55], [56] with the
VPKI handles a large workload. Moreover, it enhances user
privacy, notably preventing linking pseudonyms based on
timing information [38] (the instance of issuance and the
pseudonym lifetime) as well as offers strong user privacy
protection even in the presence of honest-but-curious VPKI
entities. More precisely, a universally fixed interval, Γ, is
specified by the H-LTCA and all pseudonyms in that domain
are issued with the lifetime (τP ) aligned with the VPKI clock.
Vehicles obtain pseudonyms on-the-fly as they operate, and
the number of pseudonyms in a request is Γτp , i.e., no prior
calculation needed. As a result of this policy, at any point in
time, all vehicles pseudonyms are indistinguishable based on
issuance time thanks to this time alignment, i.e., eliminating
any distinction among pseudonym sets of different vehicles,
thus enhancing user privacy. We leverage and enhance the
functionality of this VPKI system; in particular, our solution
necessitates two modifications during pseudonym acqui-
sition process, notably (i) implicitly binding pseudonyms
issued to a given requester per Γ, and (ii) integrating a
fingerprint into a subset of the pseudonyms for efficient CRL
validation (detailed description in [41]).
High-level overview: The default policy is to distribute
all revocation information to all vehicles. Nonetheless, this
approach ignores the locality, the temporal nature of pseudo-
nyms, and other constraints, e.g., the average daily commute
time. Locality could be geographical, i.e., credentials relative
to the corresponding region, and temporal, i.e., relevance to
the lifetime of pseudonyms with respect to the trip duration
of a vehicle. To efficiently, effectively, and timely distribute
the CRLs across the V2X network, we propose making the
CRL acquisition process vehicle-centric, i.e., through a content-
based and context-sensitive ‘‘publish-subscribe’’ scheme [58], [59].
By starting a new trip, each vehicle only subscribes to
receive the pieces of CRLs, i.e., the content, corresponding to
its actual trip duration and its targeted region, i.e., the context.
To reap the benefits of the ephemeral nature pseudonyms
and the timely-aligned pseudonym provisioning policy,
towards an effective, efficient, and scalable CRL distribution,
a fixed interval, ΓCRL, is predetermined by the PCAs in
the domain. They publicize revoked pseudonyms whose
lifetimes fall within ΓCRL, i.e., distributing only the serial
number of these pseudonyms rather than publishing the
entire CRL. Note that Γ, the universally fixed interval to
obtain pseudonyms [43], and ΓCRL are not necessarily
aligned due to the unpredictable nature of revocation events.
When a vehicle reliably connects to the VPKI, it can
obtain the ‘‘necessary’’ CRL pieces corresponding to its trip
duration during the pseudonym acquisition phase. However,
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Fig. 1. A vehicle-centric approach: each vehicle only subscribes for pieces
of CRLs corresponding to its trip duration.
if reliable connectivity is not guaranteed, or if a vehicle
obtained (possibly preloaded with enough) pseudonyms
in advance, or a new revocation event happens, one can be
notified about a new CRL-update (revocation) event: a signed
fingerprint (a Bloom Filter (BF) [35], [36]) of CRL pieces
is broadcasted by RSUs; furthermore, it is appended in a
subset of recently issued pseudonyms for a subset of vehicles
(termed fingerprint-carrier nodes); these pseudonyms are
attached to as typically all Cooperative Awareness Messages
(CAMs). This essentially piggybacks a notification about the
latest CRL-update event and an authenticator for validating
CRL pieces. This provides CRL validation for free in terms of
computational overhead: pseudonyms are readily validated
by the receiving vehicles since each vehicle verifies the
signature on a pseudonym before validating the content
of a CAM, i.e., the verification of CRL pieces does not incur
extra computation overhead. This eliminates the need for
signature verification, but a BF membership test, for each
CRL piece as the fingerprint is signed by the PCA.
Our scheme does not require prior knowledge on trip
duration to obtain CRLs, i.e., a vehicle can be oblivious to the
trip duration. In fact, such information would not be relevant
to the CRL dissemination: due to the unpredictable nature
of revocation events, the PCAs disseminate at each point
revoked pseudonyms whose lifetimes fall within a ΓCRL
interval. In other words, even if a vehicle knows the trip
duration, it will not receive revocation information regarding
the far future. In contrast, the revocation information is
progressively distributed among the vehicles. The reason is
twofold: first, trivially, some revocation events are not yet
scheduled; receiving CRLs within a near time horizon is more
likely to include the latest revocation information. Moreover,
upon resolving the issue that led to the revocation of a
malfunctioning or misbehaving entity before the next update
of the CRL, the corresponding credentials should not be
included in the CRL, i.e., achieving reversible revocation
status. The percentage of the information that is relevant at a
given point in time, and is included in the CRL, is a function
of pseudonym lifetime (τp), and the size of the ΓCRL interval.
More precisely, the shorter the pseudonym lifetime (τp) and
the longer the ΓCRL intervals are, the higher the number of
revocation entries is, i.e., the larger the CRL size.
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Fig. 2. (a) Revoked pseudonyms in a ΓjCRL. (b) Fingerprint construction.
Fig. 1 illustrates an example of 24 revoked pseudonyms
to be distributed. A vehicle traveling within Γ1CRL would
possibly only face revoked pseudonyms with a lifetime
falling in that interval, 6 pseudonyms, shown in black,
instead of all 24 entries (the blurred pseudonyms are expired,
thus not included in the CRL). These 6 revoked pseudonyms
within Γ1CRL can be implicitly bound without compromising
their unlinkability prior to the revocation event, in a way
that one can simply derive subsequent pseudonyms from
an anchor (the blurred pseudonyms are non-revoked but
expired and they cannot be linked to the revoked ones).
Thus, in this example, distributing 3 entries for that vehicle
is sufficient. Another vehicle, however, traveling for a longer
duration, from the middle of Γ1CRL till the beginning of Γ3CRL,
would need to be provided with all 24 revocation entries, i.e.,
requiring 9 entries to derive all 24 revoked pseudonyms.
Fig. 2 shows how the PCA condenses the revocation
information corresponding to nine compromised vehicles,
each having 6 pseudonyms within a ΓjCRL interval. The
PCA utilizes the hash chain value for each set of revoked
pseudonyms, generated during the pseudonym acquisition
process [41]. Exactly because downloading a large CRL file
is challenging, with vehicles and RSUs disseminating or
exchanging the CRL over short contact (vehicle-to-vehicle
or vehicle-to-RSU) periods, the PCA splits a large CRL into
several pieces constructed by including the serial number of
the first revoked pseudonym along with the corresponding
complementary1 information. In order to ensure the authen-
ticity and integrity of each CRL piece, the trivial solution
is to sign each piece. However, this would incur significant
computation and communication overhead, which grows
linearly with the number of CRL pieces, both for the VPKI
and for the receiving vehicles.
For efficient validation of CRL pieces, the PCA con-
denses authentication information for all the CRL pieces
by constructing a probabilistic data structure, i.e., a Bloom
Filter (BF). This condensed fingerprint is signed by the PCA
and periodically broadcasted by RSUs; moreover, it is also
integrated into a subset of recently issued pseudonyms,
which are broadcasted along with CAMs. This notifies other
vehicles about a new revocation event (and thus an updated
1. The complementary information is constructed by the PCA during
pseudonym acquisition process: the PCA implicitly correlates a batch
of pseudonyms belonging to each requester. This essentially enables
efficient distribution of the CRL because the PCA only needs to
include one entry per batch of pseudonyms without compromising
their unlinkability. We refer interested readers to our earlier work [41]
for the detailed protocol description.
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Fig. 3. Vehicle-centric ∆-CRL distribution.
CRL) as well as facilitates very fast validation of CRL
pieces. This authenticator (or notification) is a condensed
authenticator for the CRL pieces, and it can be broadcasted
within a region very fast. Pseudonyms by default have to be
authenticated by any vehicle. This implies validation of CRL
pieces almost for free. Note that the PCA does not compress
the CRL using a BF; rather, it utilizes a BF for efficiently
validating CRL pieces. In fact, our vehicle-centric scheme
does not need to compress CRLs because it effectively and
progressively distributes revocation information correspond-
ing to the actual vehicle trip duration.
∆-CRL updates: Each ΓCRL interval could potentially
have a base-CRL, including non-expired revoked pseudo-
nyms whose lifetimes fall within that ΓCRL interval. If new
revocation event happen within a given ΓCRL interval, the
PCA releases ∆-CRLs to narrow down the vulnerability
window, i.e., the interval between a revocation event until
the time all vehicles successfully obtain the latest revocation
information. ∆-CRLs disseminate the revoked but not-yet-
expired pseudonyms that are not included in the base-CRL.
To ensure the authenticity of each ∆-CRL (piece), a trivial
solution would be for the PCA to either sign each piece, i.e.,
the baseline scheme, or construct another fingerprint and sign
it, i.e., similar to vehicle-centric CRL distribution. However,
due to unpredictable nature and potentially multiplicity of
the revocation events, and more important, resilience consid-
erations, i.e., performing a signature flooding attack [33] by
broadcasting fake pieces, such solutions are not desirable.
Fig. 3 shows how the latest revocation information is
disseminated within a ΓjCRL interval. The PCA creates a
hash chain, N times, for each ΓjCRL, where N is
ΓCRL
τp
and it
assigns the hash values sequentially to the time intervals, i.e.,
one key per τP . Each hash value represents a cryptographic
key to compute a Message Authentication Code (MAC),
similar to [60], for all the ∆-CRL pieces for that interval. The
hash anchor is signed by the PCA and is included in the
base-CRL pieces. Each ∆-CRL piece contains the most recent
revocation information, not included in the base-CRL, and a
MAC of that piece. The PCA then reveals these hash values
in the reverse order of generation. At every pseudonym
7transition process2, the PCA discloses the most recent one-
way hash value, i.e., the key to the MAC, that it can disclose.
As Fig. 3 shows, a new revocation event happened
in interval i − 1, e.g., a vehicle was compromised and
it disseminates erroneous information across the network.
Thus, all credentials corresponding to that vehicle should
be revoked. The PCA constructs a ∆-CRL by including
the serial number of the revoked pseudonym to be used
during interval i. The PCA distributes the ∆-CRL pieces
to be used during interval i during the interval i − 1.
Upon a pseudonym transition, the PCA discloses Ki, the
cryptographic key to compute the MAC of the ∆-CRL pieces.
In the next interval i, there is a new revocation event and
three more vehicles are compromised. The PCA constructs a
∆-CRL piece, corresponding to interval i+ 1, and includes
four entries (including the revoked one from the previous
event). Again, upon a pseudonym transition, the PCA reveals
Ki+1 to authenticate the ∆-CRL pieces corresponding to the
interval i+ 1. Note that in order to facilitate a fine-grained
and reversible pseudonym revocation status, the PCA does
not disclose the complementary information for the revoked
pseudonyms in each ∆-CRL piece (unlike the base-CRLs).
Rather, it progressively and accumulatively distributes the
revocation information in each pseudonym interval. This
way, upon resolving the issues that led to the revocation
of a misbehaving or malfunctioning vehicle, the PCA can
easily stop including the serial number of the pseudonyms,
belonging to that vehicle, into the ∆-CRLs.
Note that within each time interval (τ iP ), the PCA
distributes ∆-CRL pieces including the serial number of
pseudonyms, whose lifetimes fall within the next time
interval (τ i+1P ). However, vehicles cannot authenticate the
∆-CRL pieces until the PCA discloses the cryptographic
key for that interval. Since vehicles know the schedule for
disclosing the secret key (every τP ) and they are loosely
synchronized with the VPKI clock, they wait for the delayed
disclosure of keys at every pseudonym transition3. Upon
receiving the secret key, vehicles can validate the buffered
∆-CRL piece(s). However, after the disclosure of the secret
key for an interval, vehicles do not accept any ∆-CRL
piece because such pieces could have been manipulated, i.e.,
forged by an adversary with the knowledge of the recently
released key. Note that RSUs push ∆-CRLs as well as the
corresponding secret keys throughout the entire VC systems;
as a result, the distribution of ∆-CRLs in this way does not
affect (change) the distribution of base-CRLs.
This flexible design allows to temporarily evict an entity
from the system: during each τP , the PCA only distributes
serial numbers of revoked pseudonyms, whose validity
intervals fall within the successive τP . Upon resolving the
misbehavior or malfunctioning, the PCA is informed (by
the RA) and it does not include the serial number of the
previously revoked entity into the CRLs or ∆-CRLs. Thus,
our vehicle-centric scheme provides a flexible, reversible,
2. Pseudonym transition is the process of switching from one
pseudonym (and the corresponding private key) to another one (ideally,
non-previously used) to ensure message unlinkability.
3. Note that we assume the VPKI issues time-aligned pseudonyms,
with non-overlapping interval, for all vehicles; thus, all vehicles know
the exact time key disclosure by the PCA and they change their
pseudonyms at the same time [43].
TABLE 1
Notation Used in the Protocols.
Notation Description Notation Description
(P iv)pca, P
i
v a valid psnym signed by the PCA γ frequency of distribution/broadcasting
(Kiv, k
i
v) psnym pub./priv. key pairs p BF false positive rate
SN , SNP psnym serial number m BF size
(msg)σv signed msg with vehicle’s priv. key k BF optimal hash functions
LTC Long Term Certificate Γ interval to issue time-aligned psnyms
tnow, ts, te a fresh, starting, ending timestamp ΓCRL interval to release CRLs
Sign(Lkca,msg) signing a msg with CA’s priv. key B max. bandwidth for CRL distribution
V erify(LTCca,msg) verifying with the CA’s pub. key R revocation rate
H()/H ′()/Hk(), H hash function (k times), hash value N number of CRL pieces in a ΓCRL interval
Append() adding a revoked psnym to CRLs n number of remaining psnyms in each batch
MAC(),MAC Keyed hash function/value CRLv CRL version
Ki commitment key for interval i ∅ Null or empty vector
K ′i key to compute MAC for interval i τP pseudonym lifetime
BFTest() BF membership test w, i, j, ζ temporary variables
and fine-grained revocation management towards evicting a
malfunctioning or misbehaving vehicle for an interval until
the issue is resolved. Moreover, this procedure does not harm
user privacy: the PCA cannot identify the actual identity of a
misbehaving vehicle; also, upon resolving the issue, the PCA,
as the issuer, can only link successive pseudonyms until
the end of Γ; thus, user privacy is not degraded. Further
discussion on security and privacy in Sec. 5.
4.2 Security Protocols
In a nutshell, the PCAs operating in a domain construct the
CRLs [41] and ∆-CRLs by sorting the revoked pseudonyms
based on their validity periods in a ΓCRL interval and
push them to the RSUs. For ease of exposition, we assume
there is one PCA, even though the extension with multiple
PCAs within a given domain is straightforward. RSUs and
fingerprint-carrier peers publish the CRL-update notification
and the CRL pieces (Sec. 4.2.1). Moreover, RSUs push
∆-CRLs and the MAC secret keys throughout the entire
VC systems (Protocol 1 in Sec. 4.2.2). Upon receiving a
new revocation event, each vehicle broadcasts a query to its
neighbors to fetch the (missing) pieces of the CRL/∆-CRL,
e.g., similarly to [61], corresponding to its actual trip duration
(Sec. 4.2.3). Finally, it parses recovered CRL pieces and stores
them locally (Protocol 2 in Sec. 4.2.4). Due to space limitations,
we refer readers to our prior work [41] for the pseudonym
acquisition process and CRL construction protocols. The
notation is given in Table 1.
4.2.1 Publishing the CRL
Each RSU continuously broadcasts the signed fingerprint
of CRL pieces, to notify vehicles in a region about any
new revocation event. The transmission rate of the signed
fingerprint corresponding to the current ΓiCRL can gradually
decrease towards the end of ΓiCRL; instead, the transmission
rate of the signed fingerprint for Γi+1CRL can moderately
increase. This ‘‘ensures’’ that all legitimate vehicles are
notified about a new revocation event, thus being capable to
request and efficiently validate CRL pieces. Upon reception
and validation of a query, an RSU commences transmission
across the wireless data link with a low-rate transmission
(without any acknowledgment from peers). Upon receiving
an authentic query for the missing CRL pieces by a neigh-
boring vehicle, a vehicle searches its local repository and
randomly chooses one of the requested pieces and broadcasts
it. A detailed protocol description in [41].
8Protocol 1 ∆-CRL Construction (by the PCA)
1: procedure GENDELTACRL(ΓjCRL, i,Ki,B, tnow)
2: Piece∆i
Γ
j
CRL
← ∅
3: repeat . Fetching revoked pseudonym, not included in base-CRL
4: SNP ← fetchRevokedPsnyms(ΓjCRL, i, tnow)
5: if SNP 6= Null then
6: Piece∆i
Γ
j
CRL
← Append(SNP )
7: end if
8: until SNP == Null
9: Ki−1 ← H(Ki) . Calculating the key for interval i− 1
10: K′i ← H′(Ki) . Calculating the key for interval i
11: N ←
⌈ size(Piece∆i
Γ
j
CRL
)
B
⌉
. Calculating number of pieces
12: for w ← 0, N do . N: number of pieces
13: ζ ← Split(Piece∆i
Γ
j
CRL
,B, N)
14: Piece∆
w
i
Γ
j
CRL
← {ζ||MAC(K′i, ζ)||Ki−1}
15: end for
16: return {(Piece∆
1
i
Γ
j
CRL
), . . . , (Piece
∆Ni
Γ
j
CRL
)}
17: end procedure
4.2.2 ∆-CRL Construction (Protocol 1)
Upon a new revocation event within a ΓCRL interval, the
PCA distributes ∆-CRL pieces to all vehicles. The number of
revocation entries in a ∆-CRL is proportional to the number
of compromised vehicles and the number of revocation
events. The PCA constructs ∆-CRL pieces by including all
recently revoked pseudonyms whose lifetimes are valid for
the next pseudonym interval (τ iP ) (steps 1.2– 1.8). The PCA
then derives the corresponding MAC keys4 (steps 1.9– 1.10)
and it splits the ∆-CRL into multiple pieces according to
the maximum allocated bandwidth, i.e., system parame-
ter B, for CRL distribution (steps 1.11– 1.13). It then ap-
pends an authenticator to each ∆-CRL piece by calculating
MAC(K ′i, P iece
∆wi
ΓjCRL
) (step 1.14). Note that ∆-CRLs for an
interval i, i.e., τ iP , are distributed within interval i − 1, i.e.,
τ i−1P , and the secret key K
′
i is distributed upon pseudonym
transition (from τ i−1P to τ
i
P ).
4.2.3 CRL Subscription
Each vehicle can receive necessary CRL pieces corresponding
to its actual trip duration from nearby RSUs or neighboring
vehicles. A vehicle broadcasts a signed query to its neighbors,
to receive the missing pieces of the revocation information of
ΓiCRL during which the vehicle wishes to travel. Having
received a CRL piece, it simply validates the piece by
testing against the signed fingerprint (already obtained
from RSUs or integrated in a subset of recently issued
pseudonyms broadcasted in the network). If the BF test
is successful, it accepts that piece and keeps requesting
until successfully receiving all remaining pieces. A detailed
protocol description is available in [41]. In case of ∆-CRL,
each vehicle should buffer all received ∆-CRL pieces with
appended MACs in order to validate them upon disclosure
of the corresponding key. When the PCA discloses the key
at every τP , each vehicle computes the MAC of each piece
4. TESLA uses different hash functions to derive key Ki−1 and to
compute MACs to mitigate potential vulnerabilities of using the same
key for different cryptographic operations [60].
Protocol 2 Parsing a CRL Piece (by the OBUs)
1: procedure PARSECRL(Piecej
ΓiCRL
, N )
2: {SNz , Rndz , nz}
N
← Piecej
ΓiCRL
3: CRLΓiCRL
← ∅
4: for z ← 1, N do . N: Number of entries in this piece
5: for w ← 1, nz do . n: Number of remaining pseudonyms
6: CRLΓiCRL
← Append(H(SNz ||Hwz (Rndz)))
7: SNz ← H(SNz ||Hwz (Rndz))
8: end for
9: end for
10: return CRLΓiCRL
11: end procedure
using that key. If the two MACs are the same, then the
∆-CRL piece would be accepted; otherwise, dropped.
4.2.4 Parsing CRL (Protocol 2)
Upon reception and validation of a CRL piece, each vehicle
derives the revoked pseudonym serial numbers from the
obtained hash anchors, by calculating a hash value n times:
H(SNz||Hwz (Rndz) (steps 2.2– 2.10). Revocation entries can
be stored in local storage, and searched with O(log(n))
time complexity. To enhance revocation status validation, a
vehicle could generate a BF locally [18] with constant compu-
tational cost (O(1)) for insertions and search operations but
at a cost of a false positive rate. Note that the search operation
is very efficient because revocation entries are sorted for the
period they are valid for, i.e., in a τP interval.
5 SCHEME ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
For an analysis on how our scheme satisfies the security and
privacy requirements, as well as operational requirements,
we refer interested readers to [41]. In this section, we
expand the security and privacy analysis for the ∆-CRL
distribution and the CRL fingerprint mechanisms. Then, we
quantitatively demonstrate the efficiency, scalability, and
resiliency of our vehicle-centric scheme, extending the results
with respect to [41], through an extensive experimental
evaluation.
5.1 Qualitative Analysis
∆-CRL distribution: Upon a new revocation event and
∆-CRL release, an external adversary can try to link the
recently revoked pseudonyms backwards, i.e., towards the
beginning of the Γ interval. However, due to the utilization
of a hash chain during the pseudonym issuance process [41],
it is infeasible to link a revoked pseudonym to the previously
non-revoked pseudonyms. Moreover, vehicles can be loosely
synchronized with the VPKI clock, e.g., through Global
Positioning System (GPS) used to synchronize OBU clocks,
in order to be informed about the time of key disclosure
(by the PCA). Furthermore, each vehicle does not disclose
the trip duration. Rather, each vehicle only requests for
obtaining CRL pieces for the current ΓCRL, which is a proto-
col/scheme selectable parameter. More so, the requests are
anonymized, i.e., signed by the currently valid pseudonym.
For the next ΓCRL, each vehicle changes its pseudonym and
requests to obtain CRL pieces for the new interval using a
new pseudonymous identifier. The pseudonyms are fully
unlinkable, and there is no memory or linkage across such
9ΓCRL intervals. The signed requests do not reveal the actual
identity of their owner, thus it does not harm user privacy.
Upon releasing ∆-CRLs, vehicle buffer all received pieces
with the appended MACs in order to validate them when
the secret key is disclosed. However, an attacker could
aggressively broadcast fake pieces of ∆-CRL to mount a
clogging DoS attack. The longer the pseudonym lifetimes
are, the higher the frequency of broadcast is, and the higher
the number of adversaries is, the larger the storage space
needed. For example, if there is an adversary broadcasting
bogus pieces of ∆-CRL (with B =50 KB/s and τP = 5
min), then each neighboring vehicle needs ≈15 MB of
memory to store bogus CRL pieces. One can apply a rate
limiting mechanism by requesting the ‘‘suspicious’’ node to
piggyback a fingerprint of the ∆-CRL pieces in its successive
CAMs; otherwise, all received packets from the suspicious
sender would be dropped. As CAMs are already signed,
any suspicious behavior could be reported to the VPKI for
further investigation.
Reversible pseudonym revocation status: When a mis-
behavior detection authority identifies a misbehaving vehicle,
it queries the RA to initiate a resolution and revocation pro-
cess. The RA queries the corresponding PCA to retrieve the
ticket, used to obtain that pseudonym. Assume a vehicle has
obtained pseudonyms for a period, e.g., a week or a month.
The RA then progressively interacts with the corresponding
H-LTCA towards obtaining all subsequent tickets issued for
that vehicle5. The RA queries the PCAs towards revoking the
pseudonyms issued for a given ticket6. In case of resolving
the stated misbehavior, the RA informs the H-LTCA to
issue more tickets for that vehicle. Moreover, the RA stops
delivering a ticket (acquired from the H-LTCA during
pseudonym resolution process [43]) to the PCAs towards
revoking the pseudonyms issued for that ticket. In this way,
a misbehaving entity can be temporarily evicted form the VC
system; furthermore, upon resolving the issue, the entity can
re-enter the system by leveraging the previously obtained
pseudonyms without necessarily obtaining a fresh batch of
pseudonyms. This flexibility also allows a more efficient and
effective CRL distribution; at the same time, this prevents
from overloading the VPKI entities from issuing unnecessary
new sets of pseudonyms.
Our vehicle-centric scheme protects user privacy due
to separation of duties: no single VPKI entity could fully
de-anonymize a user by identifying the actual identity of
or link successive pseudonyms belonging to a (partially)
evicted vehicle. Collusion by an RA and a PCA does not
reveal any information to link the users (long-term identities)
with their pseudonyms because the tickets, issued by a
H-LTCA, are anonymized and they do not reveal their
owners’ identities. Collusion by an RA and the H-LTCA
does not enable them towards linking the corresponding
pseudonyms: time-aligned pseudonyms are issued for all
vehicles, thus there is no distinction among pseudonym sets.
Upon a misbehavior event, the H-LTCA could only infer
5. In case of a multi-domain VC environment, one more step is
required, i.e., the RA interacts with all Foreign-LTCAs (F-LTCAs) [43].
6. Using a ticket, one cannot identify the targeted PCA [43]; thus, the
RA queries all PCAs in a domain to revoke pseudonyms issued for that
ticket. This strongly protects user privacy: collusion by an RA and all
PCAs does not reveal any information to harm user privacy [43].
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Fig. 4. Extra overhead for CRL fingerprints.
that a user was evicted for an interval without any other
information towards linking, thus tracking, a vehicle. For a
detailed information held by each honest-but-curious VPKI
entity, we refer readers to [43].
Synchronization with the VPKI clock: Lack of synchro-
nization between the vehicles and the VPKI clock could
affect integrity of the ∆-CRL distribution. More precisely,
in case of drifting clocks of the some victim vehicles, an
adversary can manipulate a CRL piece. Upon disclosing the
cryptographic key to compute the MAC, the adversary crafts
a bogus CRL piece, e.g., excluding revoked pseudonym serial
numbers from a CRL piece or adding valid pseudonyms
into a fake CRL piece, and broadcast to the victim vehicles
whose clock mildly drift from the VPKI clock. Due to lack
of synchronization, such vehicles would accept the bogus
pieces. In order to mitigate such a misbehavior, it suffices to
have vehicles periodically synchronizing their clocks with
the VPKI clock. For example, if the accuracy of an Real Time
Clock (RTC) is 20 parts-per-million (ppm), i.e., 20 × 10−6,
and the maximum accepted error in timestamp is 1 sec, then
each vehicle should synchronize its clock every 13.8 hours
( 1×10
3sec
20×10−6ppm ), i.e., twice a day, which seems to be practical.
Vulnerability window: Even though our vehicle-centric
scheme distributes CRLs and ∆-CRLs, there could be a small
vulnerability window. For example, when a new vehicle
joins the system within the current τp interval, the PCA has
already disclosed the cryptographic key corresponding to
that interval; thus, that vehicle cannot rely on the received
∆-CRL pieces because the key is already disclosed and the
∆-CRL pieces could have been manipulated. Obviously,
the shorter the pseudonym lifetimes are, the narrower the
vulnerability window is. In general, there is a trade-off
between closing down the vulnerability window and cost,
notably communication overhead and deploying uninter-
rupted connectivity to the VPKI, e.g., dense deployment of
RSUs or leveraging cellular communications. Depending
on the type of misbehavior and the fraction of recently
joined vehicles, the VPKI could opt in to geo-cast the signed
revocation information at any point in time, even within a
pseudonym lifetime. Alternatively, vehicles could request the
neighboring RSUs or vehicles for the signed ∆-CRL pieces.
Note that fully closing down the vulnerability window
requires an efficient revocation scheme combined with a
persistent and reliable connectivity to the VPKI entities, e.g.,
leveraging cellular-based V2X communications [62].
CRL and fingerprint size comparison: Representing
CRL pieces in a space-efficient BF trades off communication
overhead for a false positive rate (p). Fig. 4.a shows that the
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BF size linearly increases as the false positive rate decreases.
For example, for 10 CRL pieces covering one ΓCRL interval,
and p = 10−20 (with the optimal number of hash functions),
the BF size and thus the overhead for each pseudonym is
120 bytes. This eliminates the need to sign each CRL piece.
The PCA can concatenate the hash values for each CRL
piece [34]. Fig. 4.b compares our BF-based CRL fingerprint
size with the five approved hash algorithms [63]: SHA-1,
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512, each producing
hash digest size of 160, 224, 256, 384 and 512 bits, respectively.
For instance, by employing precode-and-hash [34] with SHA1
(20 bytes output size) [34], the size of a fingerprint for
20 CRL pieces becomes 400 bytes; whereas employing
our scheme results in an extra overhead of 311 bytes
(p = 10−25) or 371 bytes for the extremely low false positive
rate (p = 10−30). Alternatively, one can utilize truncated
hash digests; however, truncated message digest must be
carefully used: if the message digest length is too small,
computation of pre-image, second pre-image or collisions
becomes feasible [64]. All in all, truncation will not guarantee
the expected security strength of a hash digest [63]. A
detailed CRL size comparison with Compressed CRL (C2RL)
scheme [12], [25], [26] can be found in our earlier work [41].
Compromising the security of the CRL fingerprint: A
BF is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure that is
used for efficient membership query. It essentially provides
condensed authenticators for the inserted items at the cost
of false positives. Fig. 5 illustrates a BF with insertion and
query operations. In order to insert an item, e.g., x, into
the BF, we feed item x into k different hash functions
{h1, . . . , hk} to identify the corresponding bits of the BF,
i.e., Ix = {h1(x)modm, . . . , hk(x)modm}. In this example,
the size of the BF, m, is 22 bits and the number of hash
functions, k, is 3. Items y, and z are also inserted into the BF.
In order to query an item to check if it belongs to the BF, we
check if the item has been inserted into the BF by feeding
it to the same hash functions. In this example, x′ does not
belong to the BF; y′ is equal to y and thus it exists. However,
z′ appears to be in the set while it has never been added, i.e.,
a false positive. The false positives arise due to the collision
on the condensed hash digests and one can adjust the size of
the BF to achieve a desired false positive rate [36], [65].
There are three types of attacks applicable to BFs [64]:
chosen-insertion attack, query-only attack, and deletion attack.
In the chosen-insertion attack, an adversary can either add a
new item into the BF, or he could make the BF constructor,
i.e., the PCA, insert a new item. In the query-only attack,
an adversary targets the false positive rate of a BF towards
generating a fake CRL piece to be accepted as legitimate.
Finally, in the deletion attack, an adversary tries to delete
an item, or make the PCA delete it from the BF. Note that
this type of attack is for a specific form of BFs which allows
deleting an item, e.g., counting BFs [65].
The chosen-insertion and query-only attacks are not
applicable in our vehicle-centric CRL distribution scheme
exactly because the BF is explicitly signed by the PCA, or
it is integrated into a set of recently issued pseudonyms,
i.e., implicitly signed. However, the query-only attack is
applicable: an adversary could try to generate a bogus CRL
piece in order to exclude revoked pseudonym serial numbers
or add valid ones by forging a fake CRL piece that passes
y
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Fig. 5. BF insertion and query (m=22 bits, k=3 hash functions, n=3 items).
the BF test. Note that this is different from a pollution or a
DDoS attack: not only would it prevent a legitimate vehicle
from obtaining a genuine CRL piece, but also disseminate an
authentic-looking piece that passes the BF test. In fact, such an
attack relies on sheer computational power; its effectiveness
depends on the computational resources allocated. The
probability of generating a bogus CRL piece, i.e., obtaining a
false positive, is [35], [36]:
P =
[
1−
(
1− 1
m
)kn]k
Our scheme resists such attacks that attempt to exclude
revoked pseudonym serial numbers or add valid ones by
forging a fake CRL piece that passes the BF test.7 An
adversary could buy top-notch bitcoin-mining hardware,
Antminer-S9 [66] (14TH/s, $3,000). If ΓCRL = 1 hour and
p = 10−20, and the optimal number of hash functions,
K = 67, the adversary needs 132,936 Antminer-S9 ($400M)
to generate a bogus piece within a ΓCRL interval ( 10
20×67
14×1012 ).
Alternatively, he could join AntPool [67], one of the largest
Bitcoin mining pools, (1, 604, 608 TH/s) to generate a fake
piece. Fig. 6 shows the time to conduct the query-only attack
towards generating a bogus CRL piece. If ΓCRL = 1 hour
and p = 10−20, and the optimal number of hash functions,
K = 67, the adversary could generate a bogus piece within
70 min, which might seem a practical threat. However,
if p = 10−22 (with K = 73) or even p = 10−23 (with
K = 76), the adversary would need 5 or 55 days, respectively
( 10
22×73
1.6×1018 = 126h,
1023×76
1.6×1018 = 1, 319h). With inherently short
τP (important for unlinkability and thus privacy) and ΓCRL
interval, proper choice of p makes attacks infeasible; in other
words, irrelevant, as forged pieces refer to already expired
credentials. Upon receiving conflicting pieces, vehicles report
misbehavior to the VPKI to take appropriate actions, e.g.,
adjusting p. The results of our experiments in Sec. 5.2 rely on
p = 10−30 and K = 100.
Under certain circumstances, the chosen-insertion attack
can also be applicable in our vehicle-centric CRL distribution
scheme. For example, integrating CRL fingerprints into
pseudonyms would result in larger pseudonym size, i.e.,
increasing packet size and overhead, thus higher channel
congestion and error rates [4], [68]. In such cases, the size
of a CRL fingerprint should not exceed a certain amount of
bytes for efficiency reasons. Thus, the PCA cannot generate
a CRL fingerprint with the desired size and false positive
rate to be integrated into a subset of pseudonyms. This
7. Generating a fake BF (e.g., p = 10−20) with completely different
valid pseudonyms serial number necessitates accessing at least, e.g.,
1020, valid pseudonyms, i.e., a more powerful adversary (malicious VPKI
entities), and is beyond the scope of our adversarial model.
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Fig. 7. Chosen-insertion attack on the CRL fingerprint.
implies that the PCA should insert more items (CRL pieces)
into the CRL fingerprint with ‘constant’ size, and thus
increase the probability of false positive. Fig. 7.a shows
that the probability of generating a bogus CRL piece grows
exponentially when the BF size is constant. Fig. 7.b shows
that the probability of false positive when BF size is 100 bytes.
The probability of false positive by inserting 5 items in the
BF is 6.3×10−32. Even with an extremely computationally
powerful adversary, generating a bogus CRL piece is practi-
cally infeasible. However, by inserting 10 CRL pieces into the
BF (assuming the BF size remains constant), the probability
of false positive becomes 3.2×10−17. By considering the
computational power of an adversary to be 1.6×1018 [67],
the time to generate a bogus CRL piece (with K = 67)
becomes ≈14 seconds.
Depending on the type of misbehavior and revocation
rate (R), the number of revocation entries within a ΓCRL
interval could be huge, which yields a larger CRL size. If
this would result in a high rate of false positive, the PCA
could opt in enlarging the maximum bandwidth (B) for
CRL distribution, or decreasing the ΓCRL interval (if ΓCRL
is larger than Γ). Alternatively, the PCA could decrease
the percentage of fingerprint-carrier pseudonyms; even with
1% of the vehicles to be fingerprint-carrier nodes, all of
the vehicles could obtain the CRL fingerprint in time [41].
In our experiments, even with R =5%, B =50 KB/s, and
probability of false positive p = 10−30, the number of CRL
pieces becomes 7, with a 126-byte fingerprint.
5.2 Quantitative Analysis
5.2.1 Experimental Setup
We use OMNET++ [69] and the Veins framework to simulate
a large-scale scenario using SUMO [70] with a realistic
mobility trace, the LuST dataset [71]. For the cryptographic
protocols and primitives (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)-256 and SHA-256 as per IEEE 1609.2 [4]
and ETSI [1]), we use OpenSSL. V2X communication is IEEE
TABLE 2
Simulation parameters (LuST dataset).
Parameters Value Parameters Value
CRL/Fingerprint TX interval 0.5s/5s Pseudonym lifetime 30s−600s
Carrier frequency 5.89 GHz Area size 15 KM × 15 KM
TX power 20mW Number of vehicles 138,259
Physical layer bit-rate 18Mbps Number of trips 287,939
Sensitivity -89dBm Average trip duration 692.81s
Thermal noise -110dBm Duration of simulation 4 hour (7−9, 17−19)
CRL dist. Bandwidth (B) 5−100 KB/s Γ 1−60 min
Number of RSUs 100 ΓCRL 60 min
TABLE 3
Vehicle-centric revocation information for LuST dataset
(R = 1%, B = 10KB/s).
Pseudonym
Lifetime
Number of
Psnyms
Number of
Revoked Psnyms
Average
Number per ΓCRL
Number of
Pieces
τP=30s 3,425,565 34,256 1,428 13
τP=60s 1,712,782 17,128 714 7
τP=300s 342,556 3,426 143 2
τP=600s 171,278 1,713 72 1
TABLE 4
Simulation parameters for LuST dataset (τP = 60s).
Revocation
Rate (R)
Baseline Scheme Vehicle-Centric Scheme
CRL
Entries
10 KB/s 25 KB/s 50 KB/s 100 KB/s CRL
Entries
10 KB/s 25 KB/s 50 KB/s 100 KB/s
Pieces Pieces Pieces Pieces Pieces Pieces Pieces Pieces
0.5% 8,564 61 24 12 6 357 4 2 2 1
1% 17,128 121 48 24 12 714 7 3 2 1
2% 34,256 242 95 48 24 1,428 13 6 3 2
3% 51,384 362 142 71 36 2,141 20 8 4 2
4% 68,512 483 190 95 47 2,855 26 11 6 3
5% 85,640 604 237 118 59 3,569 32 13 7 4
802.11p [72] and cryptographic protocols and primitives
were executed on a virtual machine (dual-core 2.0 GHz). To
evaluate CRL pieces construction (with a BF) and validate
CRL pieces (BF membership check), we used a Nexcom
vehicular OBU (Dual-core 1.66 GHz, 1GB memory) from the
PRESERVE project [9]. For CRL fingerprint operations, BF
insertion and query, we used PYBLOOM [73].
Effective placement of the RSUs: We sorted the inter-
sections with the highest numbers of vehicles passing by [74].
We then placed the RSUs based on these ‘‘highly-visited’’
intersections with non-overlapping radio ranges.
Metrics: We evaluate the latency to obtain the latest CRL
pieces, i.e., from the time a vehicle enters the system until it
successfully downloads them. We choose a small amount of
bandwidth (B) for the distribution, e.g., 5-10 KB/s. Note that
request-triggered CRL piece broadcasts at 5-100 KB/s (40-800
Kbit/s) are practical because 802.11p supports data-rates up
to 24 Mbit/s [72].
Table 2 shows the simulation parameters; Tables 3 and 4
show the simulation information for the LuST dataset with
respect to different pseudonyms lifetimes (τP ), revocation
rates (R), and maximum bandwidth for distributing CRL
pieces (B). We assume that the revocation events are uni-
formly distributed over a day. For example, if τP = 60s, the
total number of pseudonyms for one day is around 1.7M.
Assuming 1% of the pseudonyms are revoked (R =1%), there
will be around 17K revoked pseudonyms in a day. With our
vehicle-centric approach, each vehicle only needs to obtain
pieces of CRL for the interval it travels. When ΓCRL = 1
hour, the average number of entries per ΓCRL interval is
around 710. With B = 10 KB/s, total number of pieces will
be 6. These numbers come from the actual implementation
of encoded packets, serialized with the C++ boost library.
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Fig. 8. (a) Bandwidth-delay trade off (τP = 60s). (b) CDF of end-to-end
delay with different bandwidth (τP = 30s, R = 5%).
5.2.2 Summary of Results
The results here complement (and are comparable with)
the presented results in [41] and they share the same
configuration and system set up. Our vehicle-centric scheme
converges more than 40 times faster than the state-of-the-
art [15], [16], [18], termed here the baseline scheme, with a
similar experimental set up (Fig. 10.b). Moreover, with the
baseline scheme, the number of vehicles that successfully
obtained the latest CRL, referred to as cognizant vehicles, is
highly dependent on the revocation rate and it significantly
drops when the revocation rate increases from 0.5% to 5%.
However, the performance of our scheme is not affected by
the revocation rate: the number of cognizant nodes remains
almost intact even if the revocation rate increases up to
5% [41]. Furthermore, our vehicle-centric scheme is more
resilient to selfish8, pollution, and DoS attacks: with 25%
of vehicles in the baseline system compromised, one could
prevent almost all legitimate vehicles from obtaining the
CRLs; however, with our scheme, the percentage of informed
vehicles remains almost intact even if 50% of the vehicles are
compromised (Fig. 11, 12, 13, 14).
Furthermore, our experiments show that the distribution
of ∆-CRL pieces as well as the validation keys are efficient
and resilient against DoS attacks; more specifically, 95% of
the vehicles received the ∆-CRL pieces in less than 52s:
Fx(t = 52ms) = 0.95, and 95% of them obtained the valida-
tion keys within less than 31s: Fx(t = 31ms) = 0.95 (Fig. 9).
Moreover, BF construction and membership checks are much
more efficient than the baseline scheme: the average latency
to verify a CRL piece for the baseline scheme (i.e., verifying
an ECDSA-256 bits signature) is 2.346 ms. However, for the
vehicle-centric scheme, the latency to validate a CRL piece
using a BF (with probability of false positive rate p = 10−25
and K = 67, as the optimal number of hash functions)
is 0.352 ms, i.e., 6.6 times faster than the baseline scheme
(Table 5 and Table 6). Finally, our experiments confirm that
our scheme outperforms the baseline scheme in terms of
communication overhead (notably security overhead) [41].
5.2.3 Vehicle-Centric CRL Distribution Evaluation
Fig. 8.a shows the average end-to-end latency to obtain the
CRLs as a function of maximum bandwidth for the vehicle-
centric scheme. The delays were averaged over vehicles oper-
ating during rush hours. The total number of pseudonyms is
8. Such nodes do not perform any ‘‘active’’ attack, e.g., a clogging
DoS attack, rather they become silent and they never respond to a
CRL/∆-CRL piece request.
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Fig. 9. End-to-end delay to fetch ∆-CRL pieces and validation keys for
vehicle-centric scheme (τP = 60 sec., R = 5%, γkey = 0.5, γpiece = 2).
1.7M (τP = 60s) and the maximum bandwidth ranges from
5 to 100 KB/s. In general, the smaller amount of bandwidth
for CRL distribution and the higher the revocation rate are,
the higher the latency for all vehicles to obtain the CRL. For
example, the average latency, with R = 5%, decreases from
45.68s to 18.48s as the B increases from 10 to 25 KB/s. It is
imperative to allocate as low bandwidth as possible without
compromising the timely distribution of CRLs. On the one
hand, allocating lower bandwidth for the CRL distribution
diminishes interference with the safety-critical operations
and mitigates pollution and DoS attacks; but, it degrades the
timely CRLs distribution. On the other hand, allocating large
bandwidth would enhance timely CRLs distribution at the
cost of interference with safety operations and/or enabling
an attacker to broadcast a fake CRL piece at a high rate.
Depending on the revocation rates (i.e., events that lead to
revocation), the optimal bandwidth for CRL distribution can
be properly determined to achieve a certain level of quality of
service without compromising the operation of time-critical
messages. For example, with R = 5%, one can increase the
bandwidth from 25 KB/s to 100 KB/s to reduce the delay
from 18.48s to 8s, i.e., 2.3 faster CRL distribution.
Fig. 8.b shows the Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) of end-to-end latencies to obtain the needed CRLs
with different bandwidths for the vehicle-centric scheme.
In general, the larger the allocated bandwidth for CRL
distribution, the less the average latency to obtain CRLs.
For example, with R = 5% and B = 50KB/s, 95% of the
vehicles received the needed pieces of the CRL in less than
24s: Fx(t = 24ms) = 0.95, i.e., Pr{t ≤ 24ms} = 0.95.
5.2.4 Vehicle-Centric ∆-CRL Distribution Evaluation
Upon a new revocation event in a ΓCRL interval, the PCA
constructs ∆-CRL pieces by including the recently revoked
pseudonyms (not included in the base-CRL). We emulate
revocation events, e.g., due to malfunctioning of sensors,
in every pseudonym lifetime with R = 5%, i.e., 5% of the
pseudonyms within each τP should be revoked and included
in the ∆-CRL pieces. The total number of pseudonyms is
1.7M (τP = 60s) and the maximum bandwidth to distribute
∆-CRL pieces is up to 10 KB/s. In this experiment, ∆-CRL
pieces are broadcasted with frequency γpiece = 2 (one piece
every 2 sec.) and validation keys are broadcasted with
frequency γkey = 0.5 (2 times per second). We evaluate
the latency to obtain ∆-CRL pieces and validation keys.
The longer the pseudonyms lifetimes combined with higher
frequency of broadcasts (and larger coverage of the area by
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Fig. 10. End-to-end delay to fetch CRLs (τP = 60s, R = 1%).
RSUs), the faster the convergence time is, thus the narrower
the revocation vulnerability window becomes.
Fig. 9 shows the performance of the vehicle-centric
scheme for the ∆-CRLs distribution. A new revocation event
happens at the beginning of a pseudonym lifetime and 5% of
pseudonyms should be revoked. The PCA constructs ∆-CRL
pieces and the RSUs broadcast them. As illustrated in Fig. 9.a,
the majority of vehicles could obtain ∆-CRL pieces until
the end of each pseudonym lifetime. Upon a pseudonym
transition, the validation key for the ∆-CRL pieces is released.
However, there is a time lag until practically all vehicles are
informed about the validation key disclosure. To ensure that
every vehicle has already obtained the validation keys at the
beginning of each τP , the PCA could distribute the ∆-CRL
validation keys in the middle of preceding τP . In other words,
in order to optimize the distribution of ∆-CRL pieces to be
used during τ iP , the PCA would start distributing the ∆-CRL
pieces from the middle of τ i−2P until the middle of τ
i−1
P ;
accordingly, the distribution of validation key, corresponding
to τ iP , would be started from the middle of τ
i−1
P .
Fig. 9.b shows the CDF of delays for distributing ∆-CRL
pieces and the validation keys. For the ∆-CRL pieces distribu-
tion, Fx(t = 52ms) = 0.95 while for the ∆-CRL validation
key distribution, Fx(t = 31ms) = 0.95. Faster convergence
of ∆-CRL validation keys, in comparison with ∆-CRL pieces,
stems from potentially multiplicity of ∆-CRL pieces and the
frequency of distribution (γ). In order to mitigate a memory-
exhaustion DoS attack on ∆-CRL pieces distribution, we
mandate a rate limiting mechanism. This ensures that a
compromised insider cannot ‘abuse’ the allocated bandwidth
towards performing a memory-exhaustion DoS attack on the
distribution of ∆-CRL pieces. Note that the distribution of
∆-CRL validation keys is not vulnerable to a DoS attack [60].
5.2.5 Performance Comparison
We compare our scheme with the baseline scheme [15], [16],
[18] that uses RSUs and car-to-car epidemic distribution, with
the same assumptions, configuration, and system parameters.
For the baseline scheme, the CA signs each CRL piece and
can specify a ‘‘time interval’’ so that each vehicle receives D
pseudonyms during the pseudonym acquisition process. As
a result, for each batch of revoked pseudonyms, a single
key si (256 bit) is disclosed. Similarly, the PCA in our
scheme can be configured to issue D pseudonyms per Γ,
i.e., D = Γ
τP
. To revoke a batch of D pseudonyms, the serial
number of the first revoked pseudonym in the hash chain
and a random number, each 256 bits long, are disclosed.
For both schemes, we assume a fully-unlinkable pseudonym
provisioning policy [43], i.e., Γ = τP = 1min.
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Fig. 11. Resilience comparison against selfish nodes with different
revocation rates (7:00-7:30, τp = 30s, B = 50KB/s).
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Fig. 12. Resilience comparison against pollution and DoS attacks with
different revocation rates (7:00-7:10, τp = 30s, B = 50KB/s).
We assume that vehicles are provided with enough
pseudonyms corresponding to their actual trips for a day.
Upon a revocation event, information on all revoked pseudo-
nyms for the day is disseminated for the baseline scheme. In
contrast, with our scheme, the CRL entries are distributed
in a time prioritized manner, i.e., revoked pseudonyms
whose validity intervals fall within the current ΓCRL interval.
Moreover, by disseminating signed BF in advance, the
verification cost is minimal compared to baseline signature
verification, i.e., zero delay to verify the BF integrated in
fingerprint-carrier pseudonyms or one signature verification
for all CRL pieces. The processing delay to perform BF
membership check is evaluated in Table 5.
Fig. 10.a shows the number of cognizant vehicles over
time for the two schemes. Vehicle-centric distribution of
the CRL pieces converges faster: the number of cognizant
vehicles is very close to the actual number of vehicles in
the system. Fig. 10.b shows the CDF of delays for the two
schemes: for the baseline, Fx(t = 626s) = 0.95, whereas
with our scheme, Fx(t = 15s) = 0.95, i.e., converging more
than 40 times faster. The principal reasons for such significant
improvements are the prioritization of the revocation entries
based on their validity intervals, thus a huge reduction in
size, as well as the efficient verification of CRL pieces.
Fig. 11 shows the average end-to-end latency to success-
fully obtain the entire CRLs when a fraction of cognizant
vehicles are considered to be selfish. Such nodes do not
perform any ‘‘active’’ attack, e.g., a clogging DoS attack;
rather, they become silent and they never respond to a CRL
piece request. Fig. 11 shows the average end-to-end delay
to obtain the entire CRL pieces in the presence of selfish
nodes. For the baseline scheme, the average end-to-end
latency linearly increases when the revocation rate increases;
however, the average latency seems to be decreasing when
the percentage of selfish nodes increases. The reason is that
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the probability of successfully obtaining the CRL decreases,
i.e., the higher the revocation rate combined with the higher
percentage of the selfish nodes, the less the average number
of cognizant vehicles is (this becomes clear in Fig. 14). In
contrast, when there are 50% selfish nodes and R = 5%, the
end-to-end latency for our vehicle-centric scheme increases
from 12.13s to 14s, i.e., ≈15% extra delay. Unlike performing
a DoS attack that is detectable, i.e., identifying the source
of a misbehaving node, detecting such a misbehavior is
challenging; detecting and attributing misbehavior to trigger
the revocation is beyond the scope of this work.
Fig. 12 shows the average end-to-end latency when
attackers conduct pollution and DoS attacks by periodically
broadcasting bogus CRL pieces once every 0.5s. The delays
were averaged over vehicles successfully obtained CRL
pieces. Fig. 12.a shows that the baseline scheme is adversely
affected when the number of compromised vehicles increases.
For example, when R = 4% and 25% of the OBUs are
compromised, no vehicle could successfully obtain the entire
CRL pieces. In contrast, Fig. 12.b shows the performance of
our vehicle-centric scheme: with R = 4% and 25% of the
OBUs misbehave in this way, the average end-to-end delay
reasonably increases (from 13.13s to 15.81s).
Fig. 13.a shows the CDF of delays when 50% of the OBUs
are compromised and periodically broadcast bogus CRL
pieces once every 0.5s. For the baseline scheme, Fx(t =
330s) = 0.95, or Pr{t ≤ 330s} = 0.95, whereas with vehicle-
centric scheme, Fx(t = 40s) = 0.95, or Pr{t ≤ 40s} = 0.95.
Fig. 13.b shows the probability of failure to obtain the CRL
pieces for the baseline and vehicle-centric schemes against
such a misbehavior. With the baseline scheme, the probability
of failure to obtain CRL pieces increases from 0.18 to 0.59
when the percentage of DDoS attackers increases from zero
to 50%. This implies that the majority of the vehicles would
reach their destination without successfully obtaining the
CRL pieces. In contrast, for the vehicle-centric scheme, even
if 50% of the OBUs are compromised and conduct a clogging
DoS attack, the probability of failure is not considerably
affected, in fact it is almost negligible, i.e., increasing from
0.015 to 0.020. This shows the resiliency of our vehicle-centric
scheme against DDoS attacks: the significant improvements
that can be achieved by prioritization of the revocation
entries based on their validity intervals, i.e., a huge reduction
in size, thus significantly increased its resiliency against
resource depletion attacks.
Fig. 14 shows the histogram of successfully received CRL
pieces for the baseline scheme and the vehicle-centric scheme.
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(b) Baseline: 10% attackers
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Fig. 14. Probability of successful CRL pieces reception (τP = 30s, B =
50KB/s). (a) and (d): no attacks. (b), (c), (e), (f): under a DoS attack.
TABLE 5
Latency for validation all CRL pieces using a BF, executed on a
Nexcom OBU, averaged over 10K runs (τP = 60s, B = 50KB/s).
Revocation Rate BF size false positive delay check/sec.
252 bits p=10−25 0.709 ms 2,819
261 bits p=10−26 0.729 ms 2,741
1% 270 bits p=10−27 0.749 ms 2,668
282 bits p=10−28 0.776 ms 2,577
291 bits p=10−29 0.839 ms 2,384
300 bits p=10−30 0.859 ms 2,329
840 bits p=10−25 2.539 ms 2,756
957 bits p=10−26 2.613 ms 2,678
5% 990 bits p=10−27 2.667 ms 2,624
940 bits p=10−28 2.774 ms 2,522
1067 bits p=10−29 2.971 ms 2,355
1100 bits p=10−30 3.043 ms 2,300
With the baseline scheme, even if there is no attacker in
the system, 60% of the vehicles could successfully obtain
the CRL pieces within their trip duration. More interesting,
when 50% of the OBUs are compromised and misbehaving
by broadcasting periodically fake CRL pieces, only 6% of the
vehicles could successfully obtain the entire CRL pieces. In
contrast, with the vehicle-centric scheme, even if 50% of the
vehicles misbehave, 97% of the vehicles would successfully
obtain the entire CRL pieces within their trip duration. This
shows that the operation of our vehicle-centric scheme is
not considerably affected even if 50% of the OBUs are
compromised, and the vehicles could still obtain the needed
CRL pieces within a reasonable delay.
Table 5 shows the latency for validating all CRL pieces
with different false positive rates. We performed our ex-
periments on the Nexcom OBU boxes from the PRESERVE
project [9]. For example, the latency to validate all CRL piece,
with R = 1% and p = 10−30, is 0.854 ms. Table 6 shows
the latency for inserting CRL pieces in a BF9. For example,
the end-to-end delay to construct the CRL fingerprint, with
R = 1% and p = 10−30, is 1.14 ms.
9. To directly compare the latencies, we conducted both experiments,
i.e., BF insertion and membership check, on the Nexcom OBU boxes
even though a PCA would have a stronger computational resource.
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TABLE 6
Latency for inserting CRL pieces into a BF, executed on a
Nexcom OBU, averaged over 10K runs (τP = 60s, B = 50KB/s).
Revocation Rate BF size false positive delay check/sec.
252 bits p=10−25 0.949 ms 2,108
261 bits p=10−26 0.976 ms 2,049
1% 270 bits p=10−27 1.004 ms 1,991
282 bits p=10−28 1.041 ms 1,921
291 bits p=10−29 1.113 ms 1,796
300 bits p=10−30 1.140 ms 1,754
840 bits p=10−25 3.334 ms 2,099
957 bits p=10−26 3.432 ms 2,039
5% 990 bits p=10−27 3.545 ms 1,974
940 bits p=10−28 3.662 ms 1,911
1067 bits p=10−29 3.898 ms 1,796
1100 bits p=10−30 3.977 ms 1,760
6 CONCLUSION
Paving the way for deploying secure and privacy-preserving
VC systems, standardization bodies have reached an agree-
ment towards deploying a special-purpose VPKI without
reaching a consensus on how to efficiently and timely
distribute CRLs in a large-scale environment. The success of
secure and privacy-preserving VC systems requires effective
mechanisms for distributing CRLs, to guarantee the oper-
ations of the systems. We proposed a practical framework
to effectively distribute CRLs: our vehicle-centric scheme
distributes necessary CRL pieces corresponding to a vehicle’s
targeted region and actual trip duration, i.e., obtaining only
region- and time-relevant revocation information. Through
extensive experimental evaluation, we demonstrated that
our scheme is highly efficient and scalable, and it is re-
silient against selfish nodes, as well as pollution and DoS
attacks. This supports that our scheme is a viable solution
towards catalyzing the deployment of the secure and privacy-
protecting VC systems.
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